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ABSTRACT
A lot of literature has been published during the past two decades
highlighting the role played by some diasporas in the conﬂicts
raging in their home countries, and on the links between
diasporas and ‘international terrorism’. Diasporas, especially those
originating from conﬂict areas, are often depicted in policy circles
as potential security threats, raising indiscriminate suspicion
towards diasporas in general. Contemporary literature similarly
treats the links between diasporas and conﬂicts in a rather
simplistic way. Little time is for instance dedicated to
understanding how diasporas might emerge and coalesce around
conﬂicts long after the migration has occurred. The article, based
on a critical examination of how diasporas originating from
conﬂict areas have been described and deﬁned in the academic
literature, proposes an alternative understanding of the nexus
between diasporas and conﬂicts. It notably highlights the
limitations and pitfalls of an approach based on single-issue
labels, which entails the essentialization of concerned groups, and
which perpetuates methodological nationalism. The article instead
proposes to understand the mechanisms by which diasporas
become involved in conﬂicts by looking at a series of
conﬁgurations, which can happen at speciﬁc temporalities (critical
junctures, crises, etc.), in speciﬁc spaces, by speciﬁc actors, and
through speciﬁc discursive articulations (how identities are
assigned, which discourses on diaspora are produced, etc.). At the
practical level, this entails the study, for instance, of contentious
spaces where diasporas are created, or which diasporas create,
but also of contentious events or time junctures at which the
articulation between conﬂicts and diaspora groups is eﬀected.
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Introduction
A lot of literature has been published during the past two decades highlighting the role
played by some diasporas in the conﬂicts raging in their home countries, and on the
links between diasporas and ‘international terrorism’. The study of the relations
between diasporas and conﬂicts often follows a securitization trope which notably puts
the stress on major ﬁnancial ﬂows that transit, sometimes illegally, from countries of
settlement to conﬂict areas, and that fund rebel movements, combatants, ammunitions,
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and so on (among many others, Collier and Hoeﬄer 2000; Horst 2008; Lyons 2007; Shain
and Barth 2003). Diaspora groups originating from conﬂict areas are also suspected of
‘importing’ these conﬂicts in their countries of residence, and of organizing destabilizing
activities through transnational underground networks. In these discourses, diasporas
coming from conﬂict zones are depicted as potential security threats, raising indiscrimi-
nate suspicion towards entire communities (Sheﬀer 1994). From the dangers of terrorism
to the risks to indigenous cultural cohesion and traditions, along with images of imported
conﬂicts, diasporas have been securitized politically and culturally. This securitization
trope is notably fed by, and feeds into, xenophobic discourses about migrants, in
Europe and elsewhere (Lucassen 2005).
Diasporas’ securitization is also partly due to a narrow understanding of who these dia-
spora communities are, and of how they mobilize. Attention is focused on diasporas from
developing countries, while diasporas from developed Western counties are rarely
regarded as being problematic or destabilizing, or as carrying the same level of threat as
those originating from non-Western societies, even though they also engage in home-
land-oriented political action. Further, these narratives often focus upon relatively small
elements within diaspora communities, which are sometimes taken to epitomize a sub-
stantially broader spectrum of opinion. Narratives on the most visible, organized and
mobilized sections of diaspora groups thus tend to obscure more discrete diaspora
groups and overshadow diverse types of mobilization.
In parallel, other studies have shown that a signiﬁcant number of diaspora actors par-
ticipate in peace building and in conﬂict resolution activities in their countries of origin as
well (Smith and Stares 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2006). Diasporas originating from
conﬂict areas have also been shown to participate in post-conﬂict stabilization and devel-
opment plans, and multiple policy schemes have been set up to harness their good will
(Féron 2014; Horst et al. 2010). In certain cases such as the one of the Irish Americans,
diasporas’ backing ‘for peace’ has been much more signiﬁcant than their contributions
to conﬂict activities ‘back home’, but has attracted much less media, policy and academic
attention (Cochrane, Baser, and Swain 2009).
All in all, whether it is to highlight their constructive or destructive impact on conﬂicts in
their countries of origin, or their involvement in ‘international terrorism’, diasporas orig-
inating from conﬂict areas are typically depicted as potential peacemakers and/or peace
wreckers. These two complementary approaches, which share a focus on the direct ways
diaspora groups impact the dynamics of peace and war in their homelands, have been
dominant in the literature at the expense of more nuanced explorations of the complex
links existing between diasporic communities and conﬂicts. Little time is for instance dedi-
cated to comprehend how conﬂicts might aﬀect diasporas, and even shape them, or why
diasporas can become involved in conﬂicts happening in countries from which they do
not originate. This limited understanding of the diaspora-conﬂict nexus, this article
argues, notably derives from the tendency to assign homogeneous and stable identities
to diaspora groups, which are mostly deﬁned by their (assumed or real) origins.
In this perspective, the article critically examines existing deﬁnitions of the concept of
diaspora, and provides an overview of how diasporas originating from conﬂict areas have
been described and deﬁned in the academic literature. In doing so, it intends to contribute
to a revised, more complex understanding of the diaspora-conﬂict nexus, freed from the
shortcomings of the peace-makers/peace-wreckers alternative, and thus to provide
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avenues for research and policy making towards de-securitized, ﬂuidiﬁed visions of dia-
sporas. The article lays down this central contribution in the following manner. First, it
shows how existing concepts and approaches ultimately fail to describe and capture the
complexity of relations and interactions stemming from the diaspora-conﬂict nexus. It
then discusses the methodological and epistemological limits of these approaches, and
argues that they ultimately lead to an analytical impasse. It notably highlights the pitfalls
of an approach based on single-issue labels, which entails the essentialization of concerned
groups, and which perpetuates methodological nationalism. Instead, the article proposes
to understand the diasporas-conﬂict nexus as a series of conﬁgurations, in which actors
such as diasporas themselves, institutions or individuals in countries of origin or in
countries of settlement, as well as transnational actors, can all play a decisive role. At
the practical level, this entails the study, for instance, of contentious spaces where dia-
sporas are created, or which diasporas create, but also of contentious events or time junc-
tures at which the articulation between conﬂicts and diaspora groups is eﬀected.
Acknowledging the complexity of the diaspora-conﬂict nexus
Originally referring to the dispersion of Jewish people, the word ‘diaspora’ has gained con-
siderable currency to the point that ‘[i]n everyday language, the term is now applied to all
forms of migration and dispersion of a people’ (Bruneau 2010, 35). Similarly, since the end
of the 1980s, the notion has generated multiple deﬁnitions and endless debates within the
academic world. While some have insisted on a deﬁnition of diaspora grounded on the
existence of a voluntary or involuntary dispersion from a mythicized homeland, nourish-
ing a troubled relationship with the country of settlement (see e.g. Safran 1991, 83–84),
other have underscored the importance of processes of collective identiﬁcation and mobil-
ization, ‘through a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links’
(Adamson and Demetriou 2007, 497). According to Pnina Werbner (2002, 121) ‘Dia-
sporas need to be grasped as deterritorialised imagined communities which conceive of
themselves, despite their dispersal, as sharing a collective past and common destiny,
and hence also a simultaneity in time’. Diasporas, she adds, are ‘chaordic’ (123),
without a common guiding structure, yet it remains important to recognize that they
are still somehow attached to their countries of origin and/or to speciﬁc myths and mem-
ories about that place. Diaspora is also to be understood as a performative concept:
naming a group diaspora erases the notion of dispersion at the heart of the diasporic
form and makes it appear as a single object (Ma Mung 2007, 413). In an attempt to
provide an overall deﬁnition, Steven Vertovec (1997) argues that the concept of diaspora
refers at the same time to a social form created by the scattering, displacement of a popu-
lation, a form of social identiﬁcation, and a mode of cultural expression. The multipli-
cation of these discussions about the nature of diasporas has led to a considerable
degree of concept stretching, and to great confusion as to what diasporas are (Brubaker
2005). Yet, ultimately, the strength of the notion is less to describe one reality than its
ability to question the polymorphism of contemporary societies (Ma Mung 2007, 412–
413). Precisely because of its ability to question the complexity of human societies, the
notion of diaspora remains useful. The multiple uses of the notion do not impede its
eﬃciency, on the contrary, they enable to always renew our exploration of social forms
(415).
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Ultimately, complexity lies at the heart of the notion of diaspora. This complexity refers
at the same time to the distinction between various forms of spatial dispersions and trans-
national communities, but also to the pluralism prevailing in each of them, i.e. their
internal complexity. Before introducing the diversity of forms that diasporic communities
may take, it is important to note the distinction between diaspora and transnationalism,
two concepts that are at the centre of contemporary academic and public discussions
(Baubök and Faist 2010, 12). While they originate in spatial mobility across territories, dia-
sporas only constitute one type of transnational communities among others, which
includes various migration, transborder or nomadic movements. Indeed, if ‘transnational
communities encompass diasporas (…) not all transnational communities are diasporas’
(21). Beyond this necessary distinction with transnational populations, diasporic commu-
nities also present a multiplicity of forms. Spatially, it is possible to diﬀerentiate between
contiguous and distant diasporas. The former are constituted by populations spread
between neighboring countries whereas the latter, as their name indicate, result from
more distant settlement. Obviously, the diasporic experiences of these communities
relate to distinctive realities. Moreover, some diasporas are dispersed in a multitude of
countries while others are concentrated in one or few places of settlement. Diasporas
also diﬀer in their histories and organizational structures. Drawing on these variations,
Michel Bruneau (2010, 39–40) sketches four ideal types of diasporic communities,
depending on their construction around an entrepreneur pole (with the examples of the
Indians, Chinese or Lebanese diasporas), a religious pole (e.g. Jewish, Greek or Armenian
diasporas), a political pole (e.g. the Palestinian diaspora) or a racial-cultural pole (e.g. the
Black diaspora).
Aside from these formal and historical variations, all diasporas also present a high
degree of internal complexity. Beyond the diﬀerences between diasporas, the plurality
existing among each of them has also to be acknowledged. Indeed, it is obvious that no
diaspora is homogeneous, to the point that it appears often misleading to designate
them as ‘a’ group. The cases of fragmented communities along sectarian or ethnic lines
provide a strong illustration of this complexity (e.g. Rwandan diaspora divided between
Hutus and Tutsis, etc.). The multiple generational layers that gradually composed diaspora
groups have also to be taken into account, all the more since these successive waves might
have been generated by diﬀerent causes. Moreover, the spatial and temporal contexts play
a key part in the construction of diasporic communities. The moment of the immigration
as well as the conﬁgurations of the host societies both induce some diﬀerences in the
experiences of diasporic groups even if they originate from the same homeland (e.g. Hum-
phrey (1998, 136) suggests that sectarian boundaries among the Lebanese diaspora of the
1980s appear more salient in Australia than in South America). Also, the main reason
given for migration might ‘hide’ other factors, for instance ‘conﬂict’ veiling religious or
ethnic factors, which may be as, or even more important, for these groups. Finally, dia-
sporas are not created automatically, their constitution is dependent upon speciﬁc
events or processes. The case of the Ottoman diaspora groups ‘becoming’ Palestinians,
Lebanese or Syrians following the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire and the
conﬂicts that followed provides a clear illustration of this complex interdependency
between diaspora and political processes.
Because of the complex nature of diasporas, their deﬁnition yields serious diﬃculties.
These complications further increase when one wants to study the links between diasporas
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and conﬂicts. As diasporic groups are multiple and internally heterogeneous, conﬂicts are
likewise intricate processes that can be distinguished according to their types, stages or
dimensions. The interrelations between conﬂict conﬁgurations and the formation or
mobilization of diasporas are therefore multifaceted. The commonplace idea of conﬂict
as the cause of diaspora formation and a shared heritage (at least in terms of transmitted
memory) among a speciﬁc diasporic group does certainly not capture the plural realities of
diaspora experiences. Among the concepts crafted to understand the links between dia-
sporic groups and conﬂict, the classic idea of ‘victim diaspora’ emerges in the ﬁrst
eﬀorts to popularize diaspora studies. This notion does not make justice to the multiplicity
of linkages between migration and violence. It excludes for instance the possibility that
those who have ﬂed their country and established abroad might not be only ‘victims’
but also count among them perpetrators of violence as the example of Hutus war criminals
leaving Rwanda after the genocide illustrates. Besides, the idea of ‘victim diaspora’ theor-
etically also includes victims of non conﬂict-related events such as natural disasters.
In the last 30 years or so, two main concepts striving to capture the links between dia-
spora and conﬂict have emerged. The ﬁrst notion, coined ‘ethno-national diasporas’ by
Sheﬀer, remains very broad. According to him, ‘modern ethno-national diasporas are
social and political entities that arise from migration (which may be voluntary or
imposed and usually from an ethno-national state or homeland) to one or more host
countries’. Based on this deﬁnition, Sheﬀer argues that all diasporas have a potential for
conﬂict. ‘Diasporas often create trans-state networks that permit and encourage exchanges
of signiﬁcant resources, such as money, manpower, political support and cultural
inﬂuence, with their homelands as well as with other parts of the same diaspora. This
creates a potential for conﬂict with both homelands and host countries, which, in turn,
is linked with highly complex patterns of divided and dual authority and loyalty within
diasporas’ (Sheﬀer 1994, 61). However, the vagueness of the concept is such that it
could include most, if not all, diaspora groups. It misleads to consider that diasporas
are inherently conﬂictual. The confusion is fuelled by ideas of dual loyalty or long-distance
nationalism, which remain unquestioned. Nothing is said for instance about the conﬁgur-
ations in which dual loyalty may lead to conﬂict. In the light of these limitations, the
concept of conﬂict-generated diasporas has emerged as a more recent alternative. It
relates to ‘networks of those forced across borders by conﬂict or repression’ (Lyons
2007, 530). Although arguably more focused than Sheﬀer’s ‘ethno-national diaspora’,
the concept of conﬂict-generated diaspora is often taken for granted and seldom
thoroughly deﬁned in the existing literature. The limitations of the concept led to the
adoption of a more nuanced approach by Maria Koinova et al. (2018) putting the stress
on spatialities and temporalities of diaspora engagement, and demonstrating the co-con-
struction patterns between diasporas and the context in which they mobilize. However,
this approach does not explicitly question the concept of conﬂict-generated diasporas
itself, leaving the full implications of the notion underexplored.
Located at the nexus between migration and peace and conﬂict studies, the concepts of
ethno-national and conﬂict-generated diasporas try to account for both conditions in
countries of origin, and context in countries of settlement. However very few empirical
studies building on these concepts propose to account for both perspectives, and diaspora
groups are often studied either from the perspective of integration in the countries of
settlement, or from the perspective of the conﬂicts raging in their countries of origin
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(and then consider them as either peace wreckers or peace makers). Meanwhile, diasporas
have become the focus of security and securitization studies, in the wake of Jihadi attacks
in Western countries. Security discourses voiced by politicians, media and commentators
alike have paid particular attention to the so-called ‘Muslim Diaspora’, assumed to carry a
high potential for involvement in violent actions. According to these discourses, the
‘Umma’ replaces the homeland as a trigger for participation in conﬂicts. One of the para-
doxes that these recent studies have highlighted is that diaspora members involved in
conﬂicts are not always coming from war-torn areas, and that the conﬂicts they engage
in are not necessarily occurring in their own countries of origin.
This calls to attention the fact that all of the deﬁnitions listed above assign static – and
conﬂict-related – identities to diaspora groups, when the reality of their relations to
conﬂict is much more complex. There is an urgent need to steer away from these
deﬁnitions that focus on the group itself and to look at the conﬁgurations in which
they might become involved in conﬂicts, and to pay more attention at how conﬂicts
might shape them, regardless of where they come from.
Approaching the diaspora-conﬂict nexus beyond reductionism
Because its deﬁnitions tend to focus primarily on group identities, the concepts of
ethno-national diasporas, or of conﬂict-generated diasporas raise ethical, methodological
as well as analytical questions. First, like for all diaspora groups, the emphasis put on
ethno-national identities entails ethical concerns. The choice of insisting on ascriptive
identities tends to overlook the internal diversity and plurality among diaspora
groups and highlights the reference to an ‘original’ or pure identity or culture that
people could not escape. Moreover, the concepts of ethno-national or conﬂict-generated
diasporas are speciﬁcally problematic as they suppose to deﬁne populations on the basis
of the conﬂict they have ﬂed. This suggests that they are (potential) conﬂict actors, and
draws additional suspicion on them, overlooking the fact that in many instances, they
might just have ﬂed a conﬂict fought by others as well as the fact that the migration
of all the members of a given diaspora labelled as ‘conﬂict-generated’ might not have
been triggered by the conﬂict. Indeed, successive migration waves can be generated
by a great variety of causes, as show the examples of the Lebanese or Armenian dia-
sporas. The dominance of security discourses regarding diasporas in general and
conﬂict-generated migration in particular tends to posit that their very existence gener-
ates a threat to the stability of their hostlands. Considering diaspora under the ‘security
threat’ prism criminalizes entire groups, on the single basis that they belong to a given
communal/religious/national background. These trends also echo the contemporary
controversies on a supposed double allegiance of people or groups originating in
another country. This vision endorses what could be called a hierarchy of identities,
whereby people belonging to what have been identiﬁed as risk groups are being
ordered to ‘choose’ and/or ‘reassert’ their loyalty to their hostland (as illustrated for
instance in the public debates stigmatizing Muslims in France). Beside their xenophobic
overtones, these discussions ignore the fact that not only everybody carries plural iden-
tities but also that these multiple facets operate more as an evolutive, interconnected
arrangement than in a predeﬁned hierarchical order.
This insistence on origins is also ethically problematic because,
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it anchors the work of the diasporan scholar in the observation of groups, rather than in the
dynamic social processes of diasporization from which these groups are created. There is also
a risk of moving towards essentializing “diaspora” as an ethnic label rather than a framework
of analysis. (Butler 2001, 193)
In that perspective, the ascription and homogenization of people behind ethno-national
labels of conﬂict-generated diaspora can be assimilated to a form of epistemological vio-
lence (Shiva 1988) whereby researchers exercise violence over their object as the ‘Other’ is
interpreted according to reductionist perceptions that represent groups as homogeneous.
Homogenization is, as Spivak reminds us, social and political control exercised by hege-
monic voices (Spivak 1990, 61). The case of the Irish diaspora in the US is an interesting
illustration of this tendency, since its protestant component, though making up the
majority, is totally overlooked in representations assuming that ‘Irish-America’ is support-
ing the reuniﬁcation of Ireland. Of course, this is not to mean that the notion of diaspora is
itself a form of epistemological violence. But the deﬁnition of a group of people in terms of
ascriptive identities as well as under the single qualiﬁcation of conﬂict-generated is. Taking
some distance vis-à-vis primary identity conﬂicts is all the more signiﬁcant since diasporas
not always dream to return to a potential homeland. This insistence on homeland origins
and return is, according to Stuart Hall, a narrow-minded understanding of diasporas,
suggesting that they belong to a ‘genuine’ culture to which they have to go back (1995,
206). On the contrary, diaspora ‘aims to account for hybridity or performativity that trou-
bles such notions of cultural dominance, location and identity’ (Israel 2000, 3).
Second, these epistemological considerations highlight methodological shortcomings.
The choice of emphasizing ascriptive identities, whether national, ethnic or religious,
may well point toward the persistence, under a new outﬁt, of methodological nationalism.
The term ‘methodological nationalism’ has been mostly discussed in the ﬁeld of Migration
Studies. It originally refers to ‘an ideological orientation that approaches the study of social
and historical processes as if they were contained within the borders of individual nation-
state’. This tendency led to the assumption that citizens of a same state would share a
mutual history and a same culture (Glick Schiller 2009, 4). While the transnational dimen-
sion of social processes has been more and more seriously integrated within social theory
(e.g. Beck 2000; Hannerz 1996; Latour 2004), it remains that the analytical focus put on
primary identities by the concept of conﬂict-generated diasporas tends to circumscribe
the study of diaspora groups under a nationalist / ethnicist / sectarianist framework and
makes explorative investigations beyond this framework more diﬃcult. As Nina Glick
Schiller (2009, 5) puts it, the tendency to,
bound (…) unit of study along the lines of national or ethnic identities (…) isolate[s] the
analysis of migrant local and transborder connections both from explorations of the new
ﬂexible modes of capital accumulation and contemporary neoliberal restructuring of
space, self, and society (…). The end result is that the unit of analysis – often described as
a “transnational community” – becomes a migrating population deﬁned and delimited by
communal cultural identities.
This is all the more problematic that many members of diaspora groups originate from
areas where national borders are ﬂuid, and whose existence is shaped by transnationalism
too, such as in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, or in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Similarly, the dominant approach on diaspora groups is marked by essentialism
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(Ragazzi 2009, 383). Studies of ‘conﬂict-generated diasporas’ have privileged primary
identities as units of analysis and have insisted on ‘long-distance nationalism’ (Anderson
1993), ethnic or communal cohesions as a way to explain the intervention of diaspora
groups in homeland conﬂicts as well as the transposition of these conﬂicts to their home-
land. This ‘neo-communautarist’ trend in transnational studies relies on a ‘biological ima-
ginary’ (Glick Schiller 2005, 303), and reproduces the view of a world divided along
bloodlines in cohesive national or cultural entities (Wimmer and Schiller 2002, 324). It
also hampers the ability of analytical and conceptual tools to recognize the heterogeneity
of diasporic groups as well as the plurality of the forces at work in local conﬁgurations with
enough precision. In other words, there are multiple ways of belonging. Assuming com-
munal solidarity and boundaries among diaspora members as well as between them and
their homeland does not allow us to grasp the complexity and versatility of the interplay
between diaspora groups and dynamics of peace and conﬂict. Such an approach also over-
looks the numerous cases where there is not one but multiple versions of nationalism in
the country of origin.
Methodologically, the problem also stems from the fact that most often, the concepts of
ethno-national or conﬂict-generated diaspora suppose more than demonstrate the exist-
ence of contentious relations between diaspora groups, also called ‘imported’ or ‘trans-
ported’ conﬂicts. These conﬂicting dynamics are assumed to be based on the existence
(or past existence) of conﬂict in homeland(s) without suﬃcient attention put on describing
the empirical reality of these relations: the potential peace making vs. peace wrecking roles
of diasporas have been much studied, but there are far less numerous detailed analyses of
the actual consequences of conﬂict in hostland local contexts (Baser 2015, 8). Against the
idea of a mechanical importation of conﬂicts, the notion of autonomization (Féron 2013)
is of primary importance as it rightfully points toward the complexity of the links as well as
the pivotal role of local conﬁgurations to understand the development of contentious or
peaceful dynamics among diaspora groups (Baser 2015). If there is undoubtedly
‘imported’ elements in the extension of homeland conﬂicts in the hostlands, ‘transported
conﬂict between diaspora groups takes on diﬀerent features and dimensions than it does in
the country of origin’ (Féron 2013, 71): transportation entails deep changes in the struc-
tures, dynamics and even narratives of the conﬂict. Displacement of conﬂict supposes its
reinscription into ‘another context with a diﬀerent set of opportunities and limitations’.
(Baser 2015, 256) The impact of displacement as well as the well-established idea that
identities and cultural practices are constructed in interactions in local and relational set-
tings highlight the methodological cul-de-sac of taking primary identities as the analytical
starting point. Conﬂicts in the homeland are crucial to the existence of diasporas (Bauböck
2008, 3), and as long as conﬂict will exist in the homeland, it will be felt by (and impact the
formation of) communities abroad (Baser 2015, 268). However, it should not mislead us
toward essentialist approaches.
Partly as a reaction against this risk of essentialization, the last decade has witnessed the
emergence of a mobilization approach in diaspora studies (see e.g. Adamson 2012; Lyons
2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2012). Deﬁning diasporas as the result, not the cause of mobil-
izations (Adamson 2012, 26) this approach enables to shift the focus from primordial
identities toward social and political dynamics. In that perspective, diasporas are the
product of mobilizations inspired by political entrepreneurs. This social movement frame-
work allows to pay attention to the processes of political mobilization that create diasporas
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in the public sphere, but it is not without risks. In particular, this approach may lead to
a magnifying-glass eﬀect Glick Schiller (2013, 29). notably warns against the ‘ethnic
association fetish’. She notes that these diaspora associations only gather a small
number of migrant communities. Hence, centreing the analysis of transnational politics
on their mobilization may give a distorted picture of these processes. Besides, these
associations usually have an interest in claiming cultural or identity uniformity as a
ground for a stronger political voice, as demonstrated by Canefe in the case of the
Turkish-Cypriot diaspora (2002, 67–68). Further, if it is true that it is not the diaspora
that creates the mobilization but the mobilization creates the diaspora, it seems diﬃcult
to limit diasporas to mobilizations. It is not our intention to suggest that the mobiliz-
ation approach on diasporas is ﬂawed. On the contrary. Its greatest merits are precisely
to look away from an identity-based conception of diaspora to shift the focus toward
social processes of mobilization (Adamson 2013, 67). Acknowledging this signiﬁcant
feature, we intend to develop avenues that would complement the mobilization
approach on diaspora.
A third methodological problem often induced by the concepts of ethno-national and
of conﬂict-generated diasporas is that they lead to an analytical impasse that can be sum-
marized as a form of teleological fallacy. As it is the case when dealing with primary iden-
tities such as ethnic or sectarian divisions, there is a big risk that starting from these social
forms of experiences leads to the overemphasis of these very notions in the result of the
analysis. Admittedly, such notions have a strong social relevance in the life of many
people. Yet, the fact that these forms are central to their experiences does not mean
that they are an adequate concept to make sense of the social reality. This is the very dis-
tinction between category of practice and category of analysis put forward by Brubaker
and Cooper (2000). Hence, using identities as the basis for analysis would only reinforce
the impression of their centrality.
It seems more useful to shift the analytical emphasis out of ideas of ascriptive identities
to rather document if, when and how the references to primary identities, communal
bonds and boundaries resurface in situation. Even if it is clearly the case that so-called
ethno-national or conﬂict-generated diasporas cannot be studied separately from the
reference to a homeland and the politics of identity, the question rather lays in the analyti-
cal focus, which should prioritize the temporalities and spatialities of contentious
dynamics among diaspora groups over notions of reproduction or importation of identity
conﬂicts. Paradoxically, the question of space and location has long been relegated at the
margins in the ﬁeld of diaspora studies (Bayeh 2015, 2). Avtar Brah’s (1996, 177) notion of
‘diaspora space’ precisely helps to resituate diaspora studies into a politics of intersected
locations – at once physical locations as well as symbolic and discursive spaces. Diaspora
is ‘a double consciousness’ (Dayal 1996, 58), a ‘territorialized critical consciousness’
(Bayeh 2015, 10). This supposes to go beyond the duality between homeland and hostland
(Dayal 1996, 46) to focus on experiences marked by the ambiguities and vacillation
between ‘here and there’ and ‘now and then’, i.e. spatial and temporal consciousness con-
stitutive of the diaspora experience, which ‘is not deﬁned by essence or purity, but by the
recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity’. (Hall 1994, 401–402). Incorporat-
ing this multiplicity of spatial and temporal experiences are crucial in the case of ‘conten-
tious diaspora spaces’ because local conﬁgurations are instrumental in the recomposition
of antagonism (Féron 2013; Baser 2015) and temporal circumstances (like the moment of
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migration or its wider global context) deeply impact the formation of the diaspora (see e.g.
Hepner 2009).
The acknowledgement that ‘all diasporas are heterogeneous and we shall ﬁnd ways to
tackle that plurality’ led to a ‘postmodern turn’ in diaspora studies (Knock and
McLoughlin 2010, 11), highlighting ‘hybridization’ (Bhabha 1994), ‘creolization’ (Chival-
lon and Martin 2006, 342) and ‘cosmopolitanism’ (Hannerz 1996; Vertovec 2010) of
societies more and more marked by the diasporic experience. These conceptions under-
line the complexity and constant evolution of identities and are thus intellectually stimu-
lating but carry the risk of a dilution of the concept of diaspora itself. Studying the
temporal and spatial contingencies and entanglements at the heart of the diaspora-
conﬂict nexus is a challenge. How to navigate these precarious routes? The concept
of diaspora remains useful in particular in its ability to question the social fabric and
articulate key couples such as the single and the multiple, order and disorder, diversity
and unicity, identity and alterity, the individual and the collective (Ma Mung 2007, 409).
Diasporas are polymorph forms, objects that point toward the imbrication of space,
society and movement (413). Because diasporas present many aspects of the contempor-
ary world, the strength of this notion hence derives from its capacity to question social
constructs.
Disentangling the diaspora-conﬂict nexus
In order to avoid these various hurdles, we propose to move away from deﬁnitions depict-
ing diasporas as generated and/or deﬁned by conﬂict, trauma or ethno-national identities,
and to understand the relations between diasporas and conﬂicts as conﬁgurations in which
actors such as diasporas themselves, institutions or individuals in countries of origin or in
countries of settlement, as well as transnational actors can all play a decisive role. In
addition, multiple factors can prompt a conﬂict-related mobilization among diasporas,
such as the politics of memory in the countries of origin and/or of migration, events or
experiences in the countries of origin, in the countries of residence, or elsewhere, and
so on. Mobilization can also be triggered by discourses pertaining to the diasporas’ situ-
ation in the countries of residence, but also by discourses of solidarity and responsibility
relative to communities in the countries of origin or elsewhere, which can themselves build
on general cultural or religious elements, or on ideologies, etc. And, needless to say, all of
this may not aﬀect all members of diaspora communities in the same way, at the same
time, and for the same length of time.
This approach entails to fully embrace the complexities of diaspora politics, such as the
fact that conﬂicts can structure diasporas which themselves might not be conﬂict-gener-
ated, that some – and indeed, many – populations originating from conﬂict-countries do
not display any interest in, or relation to, those conﬂicts, or that conﬂicts might shape dia-
sporas long after they have migrated. Indeed, as captured by Demmers (2007, 8) with the
concept of ‘diasporic turn’, speciﬁc events or developments happening in countries of
origin can trigger diasporas’ identiﬁcation and mobilization, sometimes generations
after migration has taken place. In other words, unpacking the conﬂict-diaspora nexus
demands to question many assumptions of long-distance nationalism that often remain
implicit, and to recognize that diasporas’mobilization is neither automatic nor necessarily
triggered by events in the countries of origin or of residence.
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Toward a conﬁgurational analysis of the diaspora-conﬂict nexus
Departing from a narrow view focusing ﬁrst and foremost on the causal relation [conﬂicts
=> conﬂict-generated diasporas => conﬂicts] allows us to acknowledge that the conﬂict-
diaspora nexus actually pertains to a great diversity of conﬁgurations, among which
eight seem to stand out:
The ﬁrst conﬁguration relates to a scenario that has been the focus of numerous studies
and in which some diaspora sections are indeed ‘conﬂict-generated’ or ‘conﬂict-induced’.
Obvious examples include Armenians who ﬂed the genocide in 1915, or Tutsi and mod-
erate Hutu who escaped Rwanda in 1994. That such conﬂict-generated diaspora waves
take place in no way means that these individuals’ existence is solely shaped by
conﬂicts in home countries, and/or that they wish to become involved in their resolution
or perpetuation – many members of diaspora groups would rather forget the reasons that
pushed them or their forebears into exile. It also does not entail that the diaspora as a
whole, say, the Armenian diaspora, is ‘conﬂict-generated’. Similarly, the internal diversity
of all diasporas has to be taken seriously; there are, for instance, very few studies compar-
ing conﬂict-generated diaspora sections to others, say, the Lebanese who have ﬂed the civil
war in Lebanon, and those who have left before, for trade or other economic reasons.
Second, and this has also been well studied, parts of a diaspora and/or some diaspora
actors, can be peace makers or peace wreckers, sometimes both at the same time (Smith
and Stares 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2006). Instead of being shaped by a given conﬂict,
these groups become preeminent conﬂict actors, such as currently in Burundi, where dia-
spora groups, particularly those settled in Belgium, embody the opposition to the Burun-
dian government. To put it even more clearly, this not only means that home conﬂicts can
be rejuvenated and reactivated, but also solved and terminated, through diaspora involve-
ment. Existing literature has also shown how diaspora roles can evolve with time, as exem-
pliﬁed with the Croatian diaspora, which both funded armed conﬂict during the break-up
of Yugoslavia and, in the later conﬂict stages, was active in support for peacebuilding
(Baser and Swain 2008). Yet, beyond empirical data derived from speciﬁc case studies,
little is known on what triggers diaspora groups’ support for peace, or for continuation
of the conﬂict.
Third, the conﬂict-diaspora nexus also pertains to the fact that conﬂicts occurring in
countries of origin can be transported to countries of settlement through diaspora prac-
tices, through instrumentalizations by countries of origin, and/or through other transna-
tional events or actors. Conﬂict-generated diaspora sections can carry on ﬁghting in their
countries of residence, or conﬂicts occurring in countries of origin can trigger clashes
between diaspora groups that were not necessarily conﬂict-generated, as shown for
instance by the numerous verbal and physical clashes between Kurds and Turks settled
in Europe (Baser 2015). Here again, it is important to understand that conﬂict transpor-
tation is not necessarily the direct continuation of a conﬂict which would have led to
migration, but that conﬂicts ‘back home’ can trigger tensions between non- (or partially)
conﬂict-generated diaspora groups.
Directly following up from this, several well documented cases, such as the Sikh and the
Kashmiri ones, suggest that conﬂicts raging in home countries can also literally call dia-
sporas into existence long after migration has taken place, by indexing their identiﬁcation
and mobilization towards their countries of origin. For instance, the insurgency of 1989 in
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Kashmir led many Muslims originating from Azad Kashmir (Pakistan-administered part
of Kashmir) to identify as part of the Kashmiri diaspora. Similarly, Sikh diaspora groups
started to coalesce and mobilize after the Indian Army’s intervention against the Golden
Temple in Amritsar in 1984 (Moliner 2007). Largely similar processes were at play among
members of the Kurdish diaspora after the coup in Turkey in 1980 (Van Bruinessen 1998).
Fifth, there is ample empirical evidence that transported conﬂicts in diaspora settings
can and indeed often autonomize themselves from conﬂicts occurring in countries of
origin, and become signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in shape and in issues, therefore giving birth
to a new conﬂict cycle (Féron 2017). As a consequence, analyzing conﬂicts occurring in
diaspora settings as if they were always a simple reproduction of conﬂicts raging in
home countries is not just analytically wrong, it also impedes our ability to come up
with appropriate approaches and solutions. In addition, the fact that diasporas often
have diﬀerent views on conﬂicts ‘back home’ than communities in the countries of
origin, may create tensions between them. Diasporas’ involvement in their home countries
is not always seen as positive, especially when this involvement is likely to question exist-
ing political balances, as has been already shown in the Armenian case (Koinova 2011).
Suspicions of ‘neo-colonialism’, especially in the developing world when diaspora
groups adopt what is seen as western values and discourses, and/or when they work
hand in hand with western-based organizations, also stand in the way of diasporas’
involvement.
Sixth, there is scattered empirical evidence suggesting that diasporas’mobilization with
regards to conﬂicts can be triggered horizontally, between diaspora groups themselves,
and without the direct involvement of either countries of origin or countries of residence.
In September 2015 for instance, severe clashes between the Kurdish and the Turkish dia-
sporas that had occurred in Hannover and in Bern led to mobilizations in other German
and Swiss cities, like Basel or Köln. Such cases deserve more academic attention, as they
suggest that diasporas’ mobilizations can be at least partially, if not completely, disarticu-
lated from home/host countries’ politics. They also draw our attention towards local,
rather than national, processes of mobilization.
Further, it is striking to see that some diaspora sections, whether conﬂict-generated or
not, can become involved in conﬂicts with which they have no pre-established connection.
Global and transnational networks of solidarity with regards to speciﬁc conﬂicts often
operate beyond the strict borders of concerned diasporas and, even more interestingly,
through other non-directly concerned diasporas. Transnational solidarity movements in
favour of the Palestinian cause, or with regards to the situation in Syria, are good examples
of such processes (see for instance Hecker 2012). Importantly, this means that diasporas
that have not been, even in part, conﬂict-generated, came become key actors in transna-
tional conﬂicts. This involvement can be triggered by a shared or similar colonial experi-
ence, by the construction of a common historical ‘enemy’, by cultural factors such as a
common religion or language, and so on. These cases seriously question the hermeneutical
power of ‘origins’ or of ethnic labels in the study of the relations between diasporas and
conﬂicts.
Finally, it is worth reiterating how all of these preceding conﬁgurations nurture secur-
itization discourses both in countries of origin and in countries of settlement, whereby dia-
sporas are generally represented as potentially dangerous (Sheﬀer 1994). These discourses
are in turn likely to feed processes of fear and withdrawal among diaspora groups, but also
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of reinvestment of traditional identities, thus sometimes becoming self-fulﬁlling prophe-
cies (Akbarzadeh and Mansouri 2007).
The expanding timespace of diasporas politics
Obviously, this list of conﬁgurations could be further expanded and reﬁned to account for
empirical nuances. Nevertheless, it shows how useful it is to move away from perspectives
that focus mostly on how diasporas can be ‘conﬂict-generated’ and focus instead on the
multiple ways diasporas and conﬂicts can be co-constructed. In addition, envisaging the
diaspora-conﬂict nexus as a series of conﬁgurations allows us to study more precisely
the role that time and space play both in diasporic identities and in conﬂict perpetuation,
and vice versa. In particular, the above-listed conﬁgurations show how the space of conﬂict
can expand through diaspora practices, but also how conﬂicts incite diasporas to invest
new mobilization spheres: through the process of conﬂict transportation for instance,
‘home’ conﬂicts can expand to the territories that diaspora groups inhabit, notably
through their practices of territorial segregation. Their expansion could also result from
the fact that conﬂicts can become ‘transnationalized’, while diaspora groups invest new
forms of mobilization, in the cyberspace for instance (Brinkerhoﬀ 2009). In addition,
both diasporas and conﬂicts ‘glocalize’ each other, as they are simultaneously grounded
in a speciﬁc location, while building (on) transnational linkages. Crucially, this means
that some diaspora groups perform their transnational nature through a direct reference
or involvement in one or several conﬂicts. This allows diasporic identities to be reactivated
through an involvement ‘over there’; in other words, it is a fundamental mechanism of
identity reproduction and maintenance for many diaspora communities. Similarly, the
diaspora-conﬂict nexus aﬀects time. Practices inside diaspora communities can expand
conﬂicts in time, in particular by perpetuating its memory as well as through diasporas’
practices of endogamy and other mechanisms of community reproduction, which
prolong the eﬀects of conﬂicts sometimes long after they have ended in countries of
origin. Conversely references to protracted conﬂicts allow the maintenance of diaspora
identities in spite of the passing of time. What this entails is that diasporas can be seen
as spaces where conﬂicts can be both expanded and distorted at the same time spatially
and temporally. While conﬂicts can be considered as structuring and mobilizing resources
for diasporas, diasporas can conversely constitute reproduction, expansion, and mobiliz-
ation resources for conﬂicts. In short, diasporas and conﬂicts can literally co-construct
each other.
Avenues for future research
In practical terms, unpacking the diaspora-conﬂict nexus, and studying the above-men-
tioned conﬁgurations while avoiding essentialism, methodological nationalism and teleo-
logical fallacy is challenging. It concretely entails to examine at least four sets of issues:
actors, discourses, time and space.
First, which actors activate the link between diasporas and conﬂicts? Actors located in
countries of origin, in countries of residence, or among diaspora groups themselves, are
obvious targets for analysis. Sending states’ diaspora policies such as voting rights or
dual citizenship policies, or institutions such as ministries or directorates for diaspora
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aﬀairs, which try to harness diasporas for political and economic purposes, have already
generated signiﬁcant academic interest (see e.g. Gamlen 2008; Ragazzi 2009). Similarly,
diaspora organizations or institutions in countries of residence, such as ministries for
foreign aﬀairs, play an important role in whether, and how, diaspora mobilize. It is
however important to also account for transnational actors and organizations such as
Churches, transnational and local cultural organizations, transnational political groups,
international media like for instance international TV channels, international businesses,
and so on. These actors, which play an instrumental role in the horizontal mobilization of
diaspora groups, are also crucial for bypassing the methodological nationalism that still
dominates diaspora studies, by allowing us to take the transnational nature of some dia-
spora mobilizations seriously. Such approach also sheds light on non-violent mobiliz-
ations, and small-scale local actors which are often overlooked in analyses focusing on
the most visible diaspora actors.
Second, on which discursive articulations is the link between diasporas and conﬂicts
built and strengthened? How are diaspora identities assigned, how are discourses on dia-
spora produced, on what kind of memories is the link with the home (or another) conﬂict
built? For instance, do diasporas typically refer to ethno-national linkages to trigger mobil-
ization, or are these nationalist tropes sometimes superseded by others, for example refer-
ring to human rights, to humanitarian relief, and so on? This notably entails to analyze the
types of discourses that diasporas’ involvement in conﬂicts gives birth to, or is the result of,
and to pay attention to discourses in which the term diaspora is used in relation to conﬂict,
and for what purposes. Involvement in conﬂict can function as a way to claim a political
status, to aﬃrm oneself as a political actor, and similarly the great popularity of the
concept of diaspora among migrant groups suggests that it operates as a way to position
oneself as a relevant political actor. Studying how countries of origin, as well as countries
of settlement, represent and talk about the link between diasporas and conﬂicts, and often
end up assigning them primary and ﬁxed identities, and securitizing them, is also crucial
for challenging stereotypes and essentialism.
Third, what speciﬁc temporalities or events activate this link? At the practical level, this
entails the study, for instance, of contentious events or time junctures at which the articu-
lation between conﬂicts and diaspora groups is eﬀected. These events can happen in
various settings like the country of origin, the country of settlement, but also at the
global level, as the impact of 9/11, of the war in Syria, or of the situation in Palestine,
show. It calls for analyzing speciﬁc temporalities, notably critical junctures and crises,
as initiated by Koinova (2016). For instance, which sections of diaspora communities
are more likely to mobilize in phases of conﬂict escalation or de-escalation, and why
are there sometimes discrepancies between conﬂict sequences, and the timing of mobiliz-
ations? The issue of generations, and of generational eﬀects on types of mobilization, like
for instance the importance of Internet for younger generations (see the work of Idil
Osman 2017), is also of particular importance for understanding whether and how dia-
spora mobilization is sustained in time.
Finally, in what kind of spaces is the link between diasporas and conﬂicts activated?
Particular attention should be paid to conﬁgurations in countries of settlement, including
at the micro level (e.g. neighbourhood, communal spaces, everyday spaces of group socia-
lization, etc.), to institutions within the country of origin, but also to transnational forums
(e.g. cyberspace, international meetings of civil society organizations, etc.) which might
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appeal to diasporas. Internet in particular has been identiﬁed as one of the main locations
where conﬂicts and diasporas meet. The cyberspace facilitates fund raising, but also pro-
paganda activities, and mobilization beyond the strict diasporas’ boundaries. Some dia-
sporas’ mobilizations exist mostly at the digital level (Brinkerhoﬀ 2009), and Internet
has been shown to not only change diasporas’ discourses, but also to help them overcome
the issue of representation and accountability. In parallel, it has also created cleavages
between diﬀerent sections of the diasporas, between those settled in the neighboring
countries and those settled further away, and between those with diﬀerent educational
levels, with more or less easy access to new technologies, as well as between generations.
Paying attention to issues of scale, and of spheres of engagement, also means keeping in
mind the diﬀerences that might arise between the mobilization and involvement of ‘con-
tiguous’ and ‘distant’ diasporas (Van Hear and Cohen 2017). Thus, peering more closely at
the contentious spaces where diasporas are created, or which diasporas create, is a helpful
way to understand if, when and how ethno-national identities are performed in the trans-
national arena.
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